‘The State’ and Other Basic Terms in Public Law by Baxter, Lawrence G.
'THE STATE' AND OTHER BASIC
TERMS IN PUBLIC LAW*
In South Africa there are two sorts of constitutional and adminis-
trative lawyers: those who like to have their terminology, prin-
ciples and rules nicely classified and meticulously defined, and those
who don't really care. The former, who usually follow the Con-
tinental (and particularly German) tradition, expend a good deal of
effort trying to define some fairly basic terms such as 'the State'
before proceeding to the substance of the subjects. For that they
deserve praise for having the courage to pursue this daunting task.
The latter (rather small) group don't seem much concerned with
such precision, yet seem to get along relatively well without it,
even in court. Partly this is not their fault, since Parliament itself
appears to have difficulty in being consistent when it uses basic
terms in its statutes. Words such as 'the Republic', 'the State', 'the
Government', 'State Revenue', 'Executive' and so on are tossed
about with gay abandon in one of our most important statutes.' In
other enactments we find gentlemen who are called the 'Public
Debt Commissioners', 2 and bodies that are called the 'National
Transport Commission', 3 the 'National Health Policy Council', 4
the 'State Tender Board' 5 and the 'State Trust Board'. 6 Those who
take concepts seriously will find, to their astonishment, that even
'the Republic' changes its size from statute to statute.7
The fact that 'the State' continues to function (with frightening
efficiency) despite this welter of confused terminology would seem
to indicate that there is no need-apart from the virtue of consist-
ency-for precise, all-embracing definitions of the State. None the
less, even the pragmatists (to give ourselves a polite epithet) should
not allow themselves to be struck dumb when students ask awk-
* I wish to thank my colleagues, Michael Blackman and Julian Riekert, for their helpful
advice during the preparation of this article. Neither, of course, is in any way responsible for
its defects.
To avoid constant variation-statutes normally refer to 'the State'-the word 'State' will
start with a capital 'S' throughout this article.
I Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961 (hereafter referred to as the
Constitution Act).
2 Public Debt Commissioners Act 2 of 1969.
3 Transport (Co-ordination) Act 44 of 1948 s 3. Health Act 63 of 1977 s 10.
5 State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968. 6 State Trust Board Act 88 of 1979.
7 Cf the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 s 2 s v 'the Republic', with the Internal Security Act
44 of 1950 s 1(1) sv 'Republic' and the Government Service Pension Act 57 of 1973 s 1 sv
'Republic'.
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ward questions such as 'what is "the State"?' or 'what do you mean
by "the Government", "executive" and "the administration"?'
This discussion seeks to describe how some of these terms are
used in our law. To do so, reference will be made to statutes and
cases which, contrary to what some lawyers seem to suppose,
actually constitute the law. Some generalizations will be drawn, but I
dare not claim to formulate general definitions; unfortunately there
will not be much for those who go in for metaphysical dogmatics,
and to them I apologize. Nevertheless, with a bit of luck I hope to
be able to conjure up some explanations for pragmatists to give
hyperactive students. But first the historical and philosophical
background to the confusion.
HISTORY
(a) 'Gubernaculum' and 'Jurisdictio'
At least so far as the modern world is concerned, 'government'
(from gubernaculum) came before 'the State'.' In fact 'government'
was not even used in the 'political' sense in which we now
understand it; rather, it was closely linked to the law-declaring
function of jurisdiction (jurisdictio or jus dicere), and the idea that to
'govern' implied anything more than the judicial application of
preordained law was foreign to early medieval men. 9 'There could,
therefore, be only one "function" of government-the judicial
function; all acts of government were in some way justified as
aspects of the application and interpretation of the law.'"' The
heathen ideas of ancient Greece and Rome were all but forgotten,
and the jus dicere notion of government thoroughly suited the
medieval idea that original power was located in God and that all
power descended from above." The idea of earthly man actually
making laws was a heresy. At that stage the earthly king was no
mote than a natural, flesh-and-blood man: 'The medieval king was
every inch a king, but just for this reason he was every inch a man
and you did not talk nonsense about him. ' 2
During the thirteenth century men such as Bracton began to
recognize that not all 'government' ought to be the subject of
'adjudication', and they separated the gubernaculum from the juris-
dictio, the former representing a narrowly defined area of power of
which the king was sole administrator. 3 The distinction drawn by
8 For example, Walter Ullmann Medieval Political Thought (reissue 1975) 17. (Cited
hereafter as Ullmann.)
9 Ibid.
"o M J C Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 24. (Cited hereafter as
Vile.)
" Ullmann 13.
12 F W Maitland 'The Crown as Corporation' (1901) 17 LQR 131 at 132.
11 See, generally, Charles Howard Mcllwain Constitutionalism Ancient and Modem (1940)
79-94. (Cited hereafter as Mcllwain.) There was nothing particularly exceptional about this
gubernaculum or prerogative: such rights were really only 'intensified private rights' (Frederick
Pollock and Frederic William Maitland The History of English Law 2 ed (1898) (reissue 1968)1512).
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Bracton was 'nothing but a commonplace of late thirteenth century
European political theory'. 4 At about this time the 'ascending
theory' of the origins of original power began to re-emerge to
compete with the theocratic, 'descending theory' that had held
sway during the Middle Ages."S Thomism reintroduced the ancient
concept of politics, and political science (scientia politica) was born. 16
Until this stage the term 'State' did not exist in the sense in which
we now use it. The term used for what we might call the body
politic was civitas.17 Indeed, the ecclesiastical structure of Europe at
the time precluded any such use of 'State'. For instance, the
differences between Thomas A Becket and Henry II of England, and
between Pope Gregory VII and the German King Henry IV, so
often described as 'battles between Church and State', were in fact
battles within the Church.18 Nevertheless, their struggles represented
the growing tensions between the theocratic and feudal kingship,
and within them lay the nascent concept of the State.
(b) 'Legislative' and 'Executive'
In the ensuing period the notion of an earthly 'legislative' power
began to emerge, yet even as late as the seventeenth century this
was seen to be part of the all-embracing concept of jurisdictio:
Parliament simply advised the king 'and declared the law as a court
declares it, but in a more formal way, and usually, but not always,
in general terms'. 9 The recognition of a sphere of gubernaculum
separate and distinct from jurisdictio added to the need for legislation
in order to articulate more precisely the boundaries between the
two powers. 20 And with the notion of law-making developed the
corollary: law-implementation, or execution of the law-hence execu-
tive.21 Borrowing on ancient ideas on the 'tasks' of government,
Marsilius of Padua in the fourteenth century 2 appears to have been
the first to use the term 'executive'; nevertheless, he still saw the
executive function as being part of the overall concept ofjurisdictio,
one aspect of the business of settling disputes and maintaining the
king's peace. 23 Jurisdictio was divided into legislation and execution;
executive was not, at that stage, related to gubernaculum. For where-
" Mcllwain 80. For instance, the distinction in Holland was expressed by the terms politie
and justitie (see, for instance, G N Clark 'The Birth of the Dutch Republic' (1946) 32
Proceedings of the British Academy 189 at 196; cited hereafter as Clark). However, the subsequent
development of this distinction followed a very different pattern from that in England.
15 Ullmann 12-13. In his Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages 4 ed (1978)
Ullmann suggests that the gubernaculum remained as a hangover from the descending,
theocratic thesis of kingship, and that the feudal concept of jurisdiction, at least in England,
provided the catalyst by which the ascending concept ofjurisdictio replaced the descending one
(at 117-18 and, generally, ch 3).
U5 llmann Medieval Political Thought ch 7. 17 Idem 177.
Idem 121-2, 136-8. '9 Vile 24. 10 Idem 26. 21 Idem 21-6.
2 Quoted by Vile 27-8.
23 Wherein lies the key to an understanding of the origins ofjudicial review of administra-
tive action.
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as gubernaculum referred to that portion of the king's private affairs
of which he was sole administrator, unfettered by legal prescrip-
tions, the executive function referred to the implementation of laws:
the former was, in more modern terms, 'government' according to
policy or discretion, while the latter was 'government' according to
law. Although used in England in its present sense as early as 1649
by Selden and, of course, John Locke (in 1689),'24 'executive' as we
use it at present was not to be popularized until after the American
Revolution, when it came to be substituted for the hated royal
prerogative in various State Constitutions.25
(c) 'Government' and 'Administration'
If 'executive' was still firmly within the realm of jurisdictio, what
of gubernaculum, the medieval term for 'government'? As late as the
seventeenth century gubernaculum was still a term that referred
exclusively to those regal powers of the king delimited (or restricted),
but not controlled, by the law. 26 In this respect gubernaculum seems to
have coincided with those aspects of the king's prerogatives which
were regarded as absolute, that is, uncontrolled by law. 27 The affairs
which the king could deal with as a matter of gubernaculum, such as
maintaining the peace of the realm, we would today class as aspects
of 'government', usually meaning by that 'executive government'.
Yet gubernaculum and 'executive' were not linked until the triumph
of Parliament towards the end of the seventeenth century in Eng-
land, when the control, if not yet the possession, of the gubernaculum
was wrested from the Crown. Indeed, prior to that the power of
gubernaculum was simply the king's power to administer or manage
the affairs of his realm as a form of property. Gubernaculum was
effected by what we might call 'administrative', not 'legal', orders;
his affairs were administered.'8 And this was the sense in which the
English term 'government '29 seems initially to have been used in the
fourteenth century when it first appeared: 'governors' were
appointed to manage the affairs of territories, men 'governed' their
wives, etc. 30 'Government' seems to have been applied to the
management of the political affairs of a country only in about
1553. 3' Thus Locke and even Montesquieu really distinguished four,
24 See Oxford English Dictionary (OED) s v 'Executive' 3b.
25 Raoul Berger Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974) 51ff. Note, however, that
the new 'executive power' in the American Constitutions in no way incorporated the common
law royal prerogative (see Berger 56fl).
1 Cf C H Mcllwain 'The Historian's Part in a Changing World' in Constitutionalism and the
Changing World (Collected Papers by C H Mcllwain) (1939) 1, 23.
On which, see, for instance, William S Holdsworth A History of English Law IV 1 ed
(1924) 204-7 (3 ed (1945) 204-8). Cf Mcllwain Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern 113-14.
See Mcllwain 84ff.
Derived directly from the French gouvernement but ultimately from the Latin gubernaculum
(OED s v 'Government').
" OED sv 'Governor'. 31 OED sv 'Government' 6.
HeinOnline  -- 99 S. African L.J. 206 1982
216 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL
not three, functions of 'government': the legislative, the executive,
the 'prerogative' (gubernaculum), and the judicial. 32
During the course of the Puritan and Glorious Revolutions of the
seventeenth century Parliament wrested the sovereign initiative
from the king and thereby restored the supremacy of the concept of
jurisdictio, which embraced the notions of legislation and execution
(that is, execution of 'judicial' sentence 33). The judicial function had
by then begun to emerge in its own right, and the way was open
for the gubernaculum, the power of the sword, to be included under
the theoretical notion of execution. 34
'Government' itself came to be adopted as a general term cover-
ing all three functions, legislative, executive and judicial, and 'the
Government' covered all the various organs of State. Thus Eng-
land's only comprehensive, written Constitution was Cromwell's
Instrument of Government of 1654 (during the Interregnum).
Nevertheless, 'government' has always retained traces of its 'guber-
natorial' origins and, as we shall see, it is more commonly used as a
specific reference to the executive and administrative branch, and
the executive, administrative and, particularly, policy-making func-
tions of 'government'.3 5
Here we might also note that the term 'administration' began to
be used as a substitute for the term 'government', in so far as this
latter related to the management of public affairs, in about 1681, 36
and as an imprecise reference to the 'executive' branch of govern-
ment in 1731. 31 However, right up until the nineteenth century the
term was closely allied to the 'administration of justice', simply
because England was still largely administered via judicial machin-
ery until the late eighteenth century. 38 This explains the link
between the 'executive' and the 'administration': affairs of govern-
ment were 'administered' ('executed') in the same way as orders of
courts were 'executed'.
(d) The 'State'
'State' derives from the Latin status. 39 But immediately it should
be added that the Latin term which denoted legal capacity in the
eyes of the law underwent considerable transformation in meaning
before it spawned 'the State'. 40 Failure to appreciate this leads to the
32 Vile 87. 33 Vile 55.
34 Vile 55ff. The process of subjecting the gubernaculum to law and hence jurisdictio had in
fact begun much earlier and was a feature of the events surrounding the extraction from King
John of the Magna Carta of 1215: See J C Holt Magna Carta (1965), especially ch II.
3' See 227 below; and cf OED s v 'Government' 7b.
36 OED sv 'Administration' 4. 37 Ibid 5.
3 See further A Dunsire Administration: The Word and the Science (1973) 5. (Cited hereafter
as Dunsire.)
3 See, for example, Marinus Wiechers Staatsreg 3 ed (1981) 5.
'0 See especially the exacting article by H C Dowdall 'The Word "State"' (1923) 39 LQR
38 (cited hereafter as Dowdall); and Kenneth H F Dyson The State Tradition in Western Europe
(1980) 25ff (cited hereafter as Dyson).
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tempting mistake of assuming that, by its very etymology, the
'State' has inherent capacity. Likewise, Dowdall argues very strongly
that men such as Jellinek 4t were wrong in suggesting that 'the word
"State" derives from status as used in the fifteenth century for a
political constitution'.4 2 Rather, he proposes, the word derives more
directly from the Italian stato, 'meaning the status or estate of an
effectively sovereign prince, together with the rights and powers
belonging thereto, and that the word was subsequently applied to
the sovereign power, however constituted'.43 In arguing his proposi-
tion, Dowdall shows that by the thirteenth century status was
beginning to lose its exclusively legal connotations." It came to
refer, along with the terms 'estate', 'stato' and 'estat', to persons
occupying positions of authority or eminence, as well as their
property and insignia, in addition to the eminence or authority of such
persons (status) itself.45 By Machiavelli, stato was used as a verb to
describe the technique of government of a 'State', but only because
at that time it was seen in no other light than government of an
estate (that is, managing the affairs of one's property). Thus when
Cardinal Rohan said to Machiavelli that the Italians did not under-
stand war, Machiavelli replied that the French did not understand
stato. 6 In fact, the contemporary report of this incident in French
translates stato as maniement d'affairs. Stato, at that time, meant
government. From this Machiavelli derived his definition of a State
as an effectively sovereign government.47 It was only later that those
being governed came into the picture at all, thereby introducing an
element of corporateness into the concept of 'State'. Only by under-
standing the contemporary meaning of 'State' or '6tat' can we make
any real sense of Louis XIV's remark (if he ever made it4'): 'L'itat,
c'est moi.' What he was saying in adjusted English was 'I am the
government', not 'I am the State'.
49
Of course, the gradual emergence of separate 'States' in Europe
greatly contributed to the evolution of the word. The 'estates' of
'sovereign princes' grew larger, and it was natural that State should
come to refer to a whole country as well as the governing of it.
Indeed, it was the Dutch Revolt that accelerated this development;
in the United Provinces the term Staat was expanded rapidly, with
the 'States' of the provinces becoming more and more closely,
though not completely, identified with the provinces themselves.50
41 Georg Jellinek Allgemeine Staatslehre 3 ed (1914) ch 5.
42 Dowdall 99 (my emphasis). 13 Idem 102 (my emphasis). " Idem 103.
4 Idem 103-9. 46 Idem 109. 4' Idem 111.
48 It seems that he probably did not (see Gianfranco Poggi The Development of the Modem
State: A Sociological Introduction (1978) 161n15).
'9 CfDowdall 119; Dyson 137.
o So, for example, Grotius, writing in the early seventeenth century, qualifies his reference
to the 'States' by specific reference to the 'ridderschap, edelen ende goede steden' (Inleiding 1.2.17),
and, when referring to the Dutch Republic or other 'States' as a whole, he uses the term
gentium or civitas (for example, De Jure Belli ac Pacis 1.1.1 and 1.1.14). More than a century
later Van Leeuwen still avoids the use of the term 'State' to describe what Kotz6 in his
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The events in the Netherlands served also to contribute to the
nascent conception of the 'political State'. Although 'State' had
been used in almost this sense in English as early as 1538,-" and was
sometimes used as a term to distinguish secular matters from
ecclesiastical, 52 it seems that the evolution during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries of the word, as referring to a body politic,
is largely attributable to the influence of the Dutch Republic. 3 It is
perhaps for this reason that the term is sometimes, though by no
means always, associated with republican, as opposed to mon-
archical, forms of government. Clark quotes a remark, probably
apocryphal, which seems to bear this out: 'At the latter end of
Queen Elizabeth, it was a phrase to speak, yea for to pray for the
Queen and State. This word "State" was learned by our neighbour-
hood and commerce with the Low Countreys, as if we were, or
affected to be governed by States. This the Queen saw and hated.' 54
By the eighteenth century 'the State' was in regular usage in
England.55  There were 'Secretaries of State', as the celebrated
decision in Entick v Carrington56 shows, and in which Lord Camden
LCJ made his famous remarks about alleged 'State necessity',
Ireason of State', 'law of State' and 'State offences': 'the common
law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our books
take notice of any such distinctions.'
57
METAPHYSICS
The 'body politic' is a metaphysical concept by definition. And
once 'the State' came to be used as an alternative term, it was nor
long before 'the State' was thought to have a life of its own. There
were traces of this thinking in England, 5  but the most fertile
seed-beds were in Germany,5 9 France and, more recently, Holland,
where a wide diversity of theories developed purporting to explain
the State as a political and legal phenomenon. 60
translation calls the 'Confederate State' (Simon van Leeuwen's Commentaries on the Roman-Dutch
Law translated by J G Kotz6 1 ed (1881) 1.2.12). Van Leeuwen himself uses the term
bondgenootschap and refers to the provinces not as 'States' but as provinties (provincien), the term
Staten being reserved for the 'States' (viz 'estates') within each province (for instance, Het
Roomsch Hollandsch Recht 1.2.6fm.
5' By Thomas Starkey in his 'Description of England' (1538). Dowdall (120) doubts
whether Starkey could have meant any more than 'the government of the country'.
52 'Queen Elizabeth's Act of Supremacy of 1559 was "An Act restoring to the Crown the
ancient jurisdiction over the State ecclesiastical and spiritual"; but in 1640 the Scots commis-
sioners wrote "church and state"' (Clark op cit note 14 above, Additional Note B: 'The Word
"State"' 215-16).
53 See Clark 213ff; Dyson 25. Dowdall (123) and Dyson (27) point out the Dutch influence
on the German usage of the term Staat as well.
14 Quoted by Clark (195) from a manuscript dated 1659. Cf Dyson 26.
15 Dowdall 122-3.
s (1765) 19 State Trials 1029. The office dated back as far as 1558. s At 1073.
s See the examples quoted by Dowdall at 122-3. He quotes Matthew Arnold's definition:
'The nation in its collective and corporate capacity.'
N The most prominent exponent of the 'organic theory' of the State in England was F W
Maitland, and he was profoundly influenced by the German, Otto Gierke, some of whose
work he translated as Political Theories of the Middle Age (1900).
60 Most of these are ruthlessly analysed in the classic work by Frederick Hallis Corporate
Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence (1930, reissue 1978). (Cited hereafter as Hallis.) For briefer
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Various factors contributed to the development, on the one hand,
of these theories in Germany and France, and the absence, on the
other, of any comparable development in England. First, the revol-
utions in England during the seventeenth century resulted in the
emasculation of the power of the Crown and its royal bureaucracy.
'The destruction of the royal bureaucracy in 1640-1 can be regarded
as the most decisive single event in the whole of British history. '61
In many respects the Crown (and executive) became the agent of
Parliament; with the exception of what remained of the royal
prerogative, it lost whatever independent, inherent power it might
have had.62 Even though largely subconscious, the conception of
the executive as 'agent' of Parliament has operated to maintain, to
an unusual extent, a personalized view of the Crown: 'governments
became personified in the "over-life-size" role of ministers'. 63 And
this attitude has generally suited Englishmen; it accords with their
overall approach to law which eschews abstraction and conceptual-
ism: 'the English legal mind does not take so kindly to philosophy
as does the French or German. '6
Things were and are quite different on the Continent. Ever since
the authoritarian Capetian monarchy, the inherent power (puissance
publique5 ) of government has always been a feature of public rule in
France. 66 The rise of the absolutist monarchy and the French
anxiety to assert France's independence from the Holy Roman
Empire created a sense of 'stateness' coupled with extensive execu-
tive power in the hands of the king. In direct contrast to its English
antecedents, the French Revolution did not break this power-it
simply transferred it from the king to the 'nation'. The event forced
a transition from a patrimonial, personalized concept of the State to
a political, abstract notion, and this set the stage for the develop-
ment in France of matching theories of the State as a legal person-
ality. 67
In Germany there was the precedent of the powerful Prussian
bureaucracy, which created the administrative State (Verwaltungs-
or Polizeistaat). The massive reception of Roman law introduced
more expansive notions of public power than was known in
discussions, see D H van Wyk Persoonlike Status in die Suid-Afrikaanse Publiekereg (unpublished
LLD thesis University of South Africa 1979) 152-9, and Dyson passim and especially Part II.
61 Christopher Hill Reformation to Industrial Revolution (1967) 76, quoted in Otto Kahn-
Freund, Claudine Levy and Bernard Rudden A Source-book on French Law 2 ed (1979) 201
(cited hereafter as Kahn-Freund et al).
6' Cf Dyson 40-1.
' Dyson 41. Closely allied to this view is the (again implicit) notion that political power is
a personalized trust: see Maitland's Introduction to Political Theories of the Middle Age
xxxvi-xxxvii.
6' Hallis op cit xxvii.
65 On which, see, for example, J Br&the de la Gressaye 'Droit Administratif et Droit PrivF
(1950), excerpted in Kahn-Freund et al op cit 221-6; and M Wiechers Die Sistematiek van die
Administratiefreg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 1965) 56-7.
1 M Waline Droit Administratif(1961) at the excerpts in Kahn-Freund et al 205-6.
67 See Dyson 136-8.
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English common law; and it assured the central importance of
academic (and therefore scholastic) lawyers. With the rise of the
Pandectists in the nineteenth century (and their obsession with
conceptual analysis) highly abstract theories about the legal nature
of the State were bound to be applied to a highly visible executive
authority. And legal philosophy was closely integrated with the
political philosophies of the Hegelians, who held abstract, meta-
physical views of the nature of the political State. 68
The theoretical developments in France and Germany spanned a
whole range of political beliefs, representing a tension between the
State as an entity distinct from society and the State as the major
social entity itself.69 In law this was manifested in the division
between 'fiction' and 'concession' theories, on the one hand, and
the 'realist' and 'organic' theories as to the nature of State person-
ality, on the other. 70
As can be imagined, England could not seriously get along
without some notion of a depersonalized governing entity. For
instance, in the Middle Ages she faced the bizarre situation that on
the death of the king all courts (which received their jurisdiction
from him personally) lost their jurisdiction and litigation had to
start all over again. 71 During later centuries there was developed the
distinction between the king in his natural person and the king in
his political person72 and, through a borrowing from the ecclesias-
tical notion of a 'corporation sole' (as opposed to a 'corporation
aggregate'), 73 it was suggested that the Crown was a corporate
entity. 74 However, English law has never been very consistent
about the corporate personality of the Crown, 75 let alone the State,
and, with a few exceptions, 76 the question has largely been ignored
by English lawyers.
SOUTH AFRICA
(a) The 'State' as a Corporate Entity
Following in the Westminster tradition, South African lawyers
have generally adopted the English approach in their use and
6 This necessarily superficial outline is based mainly on the numerous discussions on the
subject to be found throughout Hallis and Dyson.
9 See, generally, Dyson chs 5 and 6.
o For an excellent and extensive discussion, see Hallis passim.
71 Maitland op cit note 12 above at 136.
7 On which distinction, see, for instance, Holdsworth op cit note 27 above at 202-4.
7 See, generally, F W Maitland 'The Corporation Sole' (1900) 16 LQR 335. Maitland
describes this notion as 'no "juristic person"; he or it is either natural man or juristic abortion'
(idem 354). See also Pollock and Maitland op cit note 13 above at 518ff.
7 Described and routed by Maitland in 'The Crown as Corporation' (1901) 17 LQR 131.
7 See Maitland op cit previous note passim; and Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Theory
(1971) ch II (cited hereafter as Marshall).
76 Such as, for example, F W Maitland, Geoffrey Marshall, and David M Walker 'The
Legal Theory of the State' (1953) 65 Juridical Review 255. Walker is, as Marshall puts it (16n6),
'admittedly a Scotsman'.
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understanding of terms such as 'the State' and 'the Government' etc. In
recent times this has changed somewhat. In the first place, South Africa
has become a republic, and so 'the Crown' has dropped out of the
picture and 'the State' has replaced it. Secondly, some public lawyers
have been heavily influenced by the theories of German lawyers.""
Nevertheless, as was pointed out at the beginning of this article,
whatever effect these developments may have had on legal theories, our
law itself reveals no clear conception of 'the State' or, for that matter,
any of the other terms mentioned. In this section I propose to analyse
briefly how these terms appear to be used in the statutes and cases. In this
way a clearer, though still not sharp, picture might emerge. However, I
may as well confess at the outset to a substantial degree of scepticism as
to the necessity of a coherent legal theory of 'the State' at all. Maitland,
in the most elegant fashion, has argued that there ought to be one: 'We
cannot get on without the State, or the Nation, or the Commonwealth,
or the Public, or some similar entity, and yet that is what we are
professing to do', 78 to which one might reply-perhaps impu-
dently-that in law we can because we are.
Does this quest for a legal conception of 'the State' as a coherent
corporate body not depend upon a fallacy? Does it not suppose that
'the State' can exist in the same or similar way that you or I do?
Obviously this begs the very question that a number of the theories
as to State personality seek to answer, yet I am much persuaded by
Alf Ross's point that the inevitable question 'What is the State?'
does not, without question, belong to the field of logical analysis:
79
it assumes that a definition can be provided which will reveal the
'hidden nature or essence of things', whereas, in fact, all we can
meaningfully do is provide a description of how terms such as 'the
State' are used in the law. The search for an 'essence' or 'nature' lies
in the realm of speculative metaphysics and political philosophy,
not law-at least if lawyers want to be taken seriously. Thus it
would be a mistake to assume that sofiething called 'the State' does
or should exist as a being, and that all we need to do is to define it
properly. In one respect it does 'exist' in a manner approximating
that of human beings, dogs and trees. That is for the purposes of
international law, 'because the rules of international law have ref-
erence (in the first resort) precisely to "States"'.80 A 'State', for this
purpose, was adequately described by Woodrow Wilson as 'a
people organized for law within a definite territory',"' and such
I For instance, P J van R Henning Oor die Begrip Diskresie in die Administratiefreg (unpub-
lished LLD thesis University of South Africa 1967) 81ff; J A van S d'Oliviera State Liability for
the Wrongful Exercise of Discretionary Powers (unpublished LLD thesis University of South
Africa 1976) especially at 23ff; and D H van Wyk op cit note 60 above, especially at 152ff.
" Maitland op cit note 74 above at 136.
71 AIf Ross 'On the Concepts "State" and "State Organs" in Constitutional Law' (1961) 5
Scandinavian Studies in Law Ill at 113.
so Idem 114.
8' Quoted in C F Strong Modern Political Constitutions 8 revised (by M G Clarke) (1972) 5.
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'entities' are, in international law, entitled to become members of
the United Nations, 2 have a vote there,8 3 and so on. But apart from
the relationships between States or 'countries' in international law, in
municipal law-within the State-there is no logical necessity for
'the State' to have a corporate personality at all. It may well be that
a statute says that 'it' does have, and if the statute does, then that is
the law; but nothing inherently follows from this fact. The only
'things' that follow are those stipulated by the law itself. What is
important is that the law attributes certain actions to 'the State',
designates certain people as employees of 'the State', stipulates
certain persons or corporate bodies as organs of 'the State', etc.
None of this means any more than that 'the State' exists as a legal
word, and even, if this is what the law says, a legal institution or
juristic persona for certain purposes. Certain legal consequences flow
from its application as a legal word under certain circumstances as
stipulated by the law. No consequences flow inherently or naturally
from the fact that 'the State' exists as a legal word, institution or
entity.'
All this is nothing new.85 Yet it is easily forgotten. So, for
instance, South African cases s* have been criticized 7 for holding
that 'the Government' (that is, Executive Council) is itself a legal
persona for certain purposes on the ground that this 'is difficult to
reconcile with the acceptance of the juristic personality of the
State'.- It is only difficult to reconcile if: (a) there is a rule of law
relating to 'the State' which conflicts with such recognition (and in
these cases there was not); or (b) one's concept of the 'juristic
personality of the State' is a dogmatic one which denies such a
possibility. Although D'Oliviera seems to accept that these de-
cisions are really only 'awkward', it appears that he subscribes to a
dogmatic concept of State personality, because he talks about the
'inherent unity' of the State,8 9 and this, as I have tried to show, does
not automatically follow from the fact that 'the State' 'exists'. If the
decisions upset that 'inherent unity' of his concept, then there is
something wrong with the concept, for it does not describe the
law. To suggest otherwise is to get matters the wrong way around
and to indulge in 'sterile conceptualism'. (Of course, the law may
be undesirable and perhaps it ought to be changed, but that is
another argument altogether.) In this regard Schreiner JA, in the
92 Charter of the United Nations art 4. s1 Idem art 18.
8' Cf the analysis by H L A Hart The Concept of Law (1961) 218-20.
s See, for example, the discussion of Jellinek and Kelsen by Ross op cit note 79 above at
125-9.
s6 For example, Die Spoorbond v South African Railways 1946 AD 999 and Die Regering van
die Republiek van Suid-Afrika v SANTAM Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1964 (1) SA 546 (W).
s By J P verLoren van Themaat 'Die Wet op Staatsaanspreeklikheid' (1957) 20 THRHR
245; Marinus Wiechers 'Die Regering van die Republiek 'n Regspersoon?' (1964) 27 THRHR
161 and Administratiefreg (1973) 68; Henning op cit note 77 above at 99-101; and D'Oliviera op
cit note 77 above at 24-5.
m D'Oliviera op cit 25. s9 Idem 25n41.
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Spoorbond case, wisely warned against the unjustified reasoning by
analogy from other concepts or deducing from present concepts
what is not there. 90
Nevertheless, the influence of the South African conceptualists
appears to be growing. For instance, the new South African Trans-
port Services Act9" states, in s 3(1):
'The South African Transport Services is not a separate legal person but is a
commercial enterprise of the State.'
Although no assistance is to be derived from Hansard, it seems
clear that this subsection is a product of the 'inherent unity' notion
of the State . Yet theoretical symmetry soon gives way to practical
reality when, in s 3(2) of the same Act, we learn that
'[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in the State Liability Act ., all
legal proceedings to which the South African Transport Services is a party, shall
be brought by or against the South African Transport Services in the name of
"the South African Transport Services" . . .',
and that s 9(2) stipulates that, under certain circumstances only, 'the
State' shall be exempted from restrictions placed by the Transport
Services upon the alienation of immovable property! All this simply
goes to show, not that any immutable axiom of law has been
broken, but that the attributes of 'the State' are whatever the
lawmakers say they are.
(b) The Concept of the 'State' in Practice
If 'the State' is no more than what the law wants it to be, why do
we bother about it at all? The reasons are complex: first, as a matter
of fact the law makes frequent reference to 'the State', and so, to
this extent, it 'exists' and the law must be made sense of. Secondly,
some statutes refer laconically to 'the State', as does, for example,
the State Liability Act. 92 In such cases it becomes necessary to
determine, as a matter of interpretation, on what occasions the
statute intends actions to be attributed to 'the State' for the purposes
of the Act. Thirdly, it has become customary to regard constitu-
tional and administrative law as the law referring to 'the State', and
it is necessary to explain what we include under that circumscrip-
tion.
o Die Spoorbond v South African Railways 1946 AD 999 at 1011-12: '... it seems to me to
be clear that great care should be exercised in arguing by analogy from the rights of one
person to the rights of another whose qualities are not identical with those of the first. It is no
doubt convenient for certain purposes to treat the Crown as a corporation or artificial person.
But it is obviously a very different kind of person from the rest of the persons, natural and
artificial, that make up the community. In many respects its relationship to those other
persons is unique and there is no reason in common sense or logic for concluding that
wherever a subject would have a right of action there the Crown must have one too....
While the law does at times generalize it does so with caution; as frequently, it prefers to act
selectively according to the requirements of the particular situation.' Cf South African Associated
Newspapers Ltd v Estate Pelser 1975 (4) SA 797 (A) at 806, where it was accepted that the
'Government' is a 'body sui eneris'.
9' Act 65 of 1981. Act 20 of 1957.
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(i) 'The State' and 'the Republic'
There is no doubt that 'the State' 'exists' in law. Our Constitu-
tion Act says so in many of its provisions. 93 All the references are
by implication, but the implication is there: we have, since the
Republic came into being, a 'State President' who is 'head of the
State', and the 'State' has 'assets or rights' and, now, a 'State
Revenue Fund'. Certain persons are employed in the 'service of the
State' and there are 'departments of State'. 94 But the term 'State' is
not used with any consistency. Sometimes, in a clumsy attempt to
obliterate all vestiges of the old 'Crown', the 'State' is equated with
the 'Republic'.9 For the purposes of international law this makes
sense: every 'State' has a name and ours is the 'Republic of South
Africa'. But it is surely unnecessarily confusing to continue using
the term 'Republic' for internal purposes. Section 7 of the Constitu-
tion Act vacillates in describing the State President in the marginal
note as 'the head of the State', and in the operative part as 'the head
of the Republic', and, finally, again as 'head of the State'. Section
20 speaks of 'departments of State of the Republic', which, if one
refers to s 3(a), where it is stated that any reference to 'the State
shall be construed as a reference to the Republic', means 'depart-
ments of the Republic of the Republic'! What this confusion illus-
trates is that it was unnecessary to equate 'the State' with 'the
Republic'. We had a 'State' long before a 'Republic'. 96 The equation
leads to further schizophrenia: s 55(d) refers to 'any office of profit
under the Republic', yet s 116(4) states that '[a]ny person who
holds an office in the service of the State' may be required to 'take
an oath or solemn affirmation that he will be faithful to the
Republic'. Section 96 speaks of 'assets or rights belonging to the
State', yet s 97 refers to 'revenues of the Republic' and is followed
by s 98, which establishes a 'State Revenue Fund'.
All this could have been avoided by not equating, in s 3(a), the
'State' with the 'Republic'. After all, just because the Republic of
South Africa is a legal entity (as was the Union of South Africa
before it 97), this does not mean that in every respect it and 'the
93 For example, ss 3(a), 7, 20(i) and (6), 96, 98, 116(4).
94 Likewise, the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 says that 'the State' may be sued and will be
liable as if it were 'a person' (s 1); and the State Land Disposal Act 48 of 1961 refers to 'any
person (including the State)' (s 2(2B)).
9' Constitution Act s 3(a) and (b). See, too, the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 2.
96 Section 14 of the South Africa Act 1909 provided for 'departments of State of the Union'
and 'Ministers of State for the Union'. In 1957 the 'Government Attorney' became the 'State
Attorney' (State Attorney Act 56 of 1957) and the 'Crown' Liabilities Act (Act 1 of 1910)
became the 'State' Liability Act (Act 20 of 1957). See, too, the words of McGregor J in Ex
parte Van der Merwe: In re Havenga's Election 1916 OPD 26 at 38.
' See, for instance, H R Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The Union of South Africa: The
Development of its Laws and Constitution (1960) 170. By a similar process of reasoning it could
be argued that the 'United Kingdom' and 'Great Britain' 'exist' as legal entities (see the Union
with Scotland Act 1707 art 1)--something often overlooked by those (like VerLoren van
Themaat (note 87 above)) who thought that the 'Union of South Africa' was, in this respect,
different from the 'United Kingdom'. See, too, Die Regering van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika
v SANTAM Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1964 (1) SA 546 (W) at 549.
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State' are the same thing. One is the name of the other, and it also
sometimes demarcates a territory, 9 whereas 'the State', on the other
hand, often seems to refer to the management of 'the Republic'" and
sometimes to its property.1°° Would it not have been simpler to use
the term 'State' instead of 'Republic' except where some sort of
external identity is required, as, for example, in the title of the Act,
in s 1 (where the Republic of South Africa is constituted), and
wherever it is needed to contrast 'the Republic' with its
predecessor, 'the Union'?10 1
It seems that the sense of this is appreciated elsewhere. We do not
have a 'Republic Liability Act' or a 'Republic Tender Board'. The
use of the term 'State' in such statutes refers sometimes to the
,management' of the Republic, and sometimes to its 'property' or
'estate'; and the word 'State' seems familiar and correct, even if it
confounds the metaphysicists by perpetuating a dichotomy between
Republic and State.
In summary, one may say that, as a rough description, 'the State'
appears to be used as a collective noun for:
(a) the collective wealth'- ('estate') and liabilities 0 3 of the sov-
ereign territory known as the 'Republic of South Africa' which
are not owned or owed by private individuals or corpor-
ations; t °4 and
(b) the conglomeration of organs, instruments and institu-
tions 10 5 which have as their common purpose the 'manage-
9 Cf note 7 above.
99 As the term was in fact used by Machiavelli (see 217f above).
110 As the term was used before Machiavelli (see 217 above).
101 Just as it was necessary to call a Union Act the 'Republican' Officials' and other Persons'
Pension Act (Act 49 of 1926), because it referred to officials of the old South African Republic.
(Now repealed by the General Pensions Act 29 of 1979.)
102 It would seem that, although s 112 of the Constitution Act speaks of 'rights and
obligations of the Republic', the context of the section as a whole (dealing with treaties,
conventions etc). indicates that 'the Republic' is used because of the external relations involved;
for internal purposes 'the State' would be a satisfactory substitute. Thus s 96 of the Constitution
Act refers to 'assets or rights belonging to the State'; the State Land Disposal Act 48 of 1961
deals with 'State land', which is defined to include 'any right in respect of State land'; and the
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 s 2(2) envisages the acquisition of'property on behalf of the State',
while s 8(1) provides that ownership in expropriated property 'vests in the State'.
13 Various synonyms have been used to describe the revenues and liabilities of 'the State'.
Revenues are sometimes called 'revenues of the Republic', sometimes 'revenues of the State'.
Although only one of the various 'Revenue Funds' is officially called the 'State Revenue Fund',
all are, in a sense, 'State revenues'. (Cf the definition of 'State moneys' in s l(v) of the
Advocate-General Act 118 of 1979, which is much wider than the definition of'State moneys'
contained in s I of the Exchequer and Audit Act 66 of 1975. This once again illustrates that
such terms need not have any existence independent of the statutes themselves, which is what
conceptualists might be driven to argue.) Liabilities, on the other hand, are confused by the use
of the term 'Public Debt Commissioners' (Public Debt Commissioners Act 2 of 1969), who
seem more concerned with 'public' investments, and the term 'State debt' (Exchequer and
Audit Act 1975 s 1), which relates to 'public' debts. The term 'Public Debt' seems out of
context and confusing; perhaps it ought to be changed. We should make a clearer distinction
between debts owed by 'the State' and debts owed to 'the State'.
"0i In this regard 'public property' would be a much wider notion than the Romanistic
notion of res publicae, which would be no more than a species of the former.
"0 In the light of the tremendous diversity of entities which operate in the 'public' interest
and which could therefore be considered to be part of 'the State', one cannot be more specific
than this. For practical legal purposes it usually does not matter, since much will depend on
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ment '" ° of the public affairs, in the public interest, '°- of the
residents of the Republic of South Africa as well as those of her
citizens abroad in their relations with the South African
'Government'.
This description can never be anything more than a rough guide.
No legal consequences flow from it at all except that the activities
of the entities referred to under (b) are often, but not always,
considered to be activities of 'the State', for example, when consid-
eration is given to the question of 'State' liability under the State
Liability Act. In this regard the suggestion by D'Oliviera't° that acts
of such entities be treated as the State's own acts seems to me to be
eminently well-grounded and ought to be supported. It makes
sense, because such acts would be ascribed to 'the State' even though
there is no tangible entity called 'the State'. However, I must beg to
differ with D'Oliviera where he assumes that the basis for his
suggestion is that 'the State', unlike private individuals, has 'inherent
characteristics', which he calls the 'puissance publique'.109 In fact the
puissance publique, which is a very important aspect of French public
law,11o has, at least since the British occupation at the Cape, never
been a part of our law, and it is historically and structurally alien to
it. Under our system of constitutional and administrative law, 'the
State' has no inherent powers unless one uses the term very loosely
to include those powers possessed at common law by way of the
prerogative and those liberties which 'State' bodies and officials
might, like any individual, enjoy-something fundamentally differ-
ent from the puissance publique. For the same reason I would have to
differ with Ross where he would ascribe to 'the State' only acts of
'public authority' (heteronomous, as opposed to autonomous, acts
in which 'the State' is in a position of superiority over other parties
who are affected)." Apart from the fact that the attempt to make
use of such a conceptual key drives Ross to make all sorts of
artificial distinctions between acts which are attributed to 'the State'
and acts which are performed 'on behalf of the "public treasury"',
that approach leads us to the fiction of treating things such as
the construction of the particular statutes concerned, and where common law (for example,
the presumptions of judicial review) is concerned, the principles relating to 'public' and
'private' bodies are similar in many respects.
10 The term 'management' is used in an attempt to get away from the 'executive'
connotations pertaining to the term 'government' (see 227 below).
10 It is interesting to note that s 1 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 equates 'any purpose'
of any 'organ of State' with the 'public purpose'.
"I State Liability for the Wrongful Exericise of Discretionary Powers (op cit note 77 above) 477ff.
These suggestions were considered favourably by Corbett JA in Mhlongo and another NO v
Minister of Police 1978 (2) SA 551 (A) at 566-7.
109 D'Oliviera op cit 478.
110 On which, see 219 and note 65 above. The functional distinctions which the concept
implies may well be of use, especially in so far as prerogative powers are concerned, in
systems based upon common-law judicial review. See Carol Harlow 'The Crown, Wrong
Once Again?' (1977) 40 Modern LR 728.
111 Ross op cit note 79 above at 116ff. Cf Marinus Wiechers Administratiefreg 47-9.
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'State' contracts as if they were no different from 'private' con-
tracts, when in fact they are different in many legal and factual
respects.
(ii) 'The State' and 'the Government'
If 'the State' exists in our legislation, so does 'the Government'
(or 'government'). The draftsman of the Constitution Act could
not resist using the term." 2 There is a 'Government' Service
Pensions Act." 3 The State President, who is 'the head of the
Republic' and 'the head of State', is also 'the head of the executive
government'." 4 Ministers 'of the Republic' also represent 'the Gov-
ernment of the Republic'. 115 And the 'Government' has a seat (in
Pretoria). 116
It is not clear exactly how much of the activities of 'the State' 'the
Government' or 'government' refers to. In s 23 of the Constitution
Act 'Government' appears to be applied to both the executive and
legislative activities of 'the State',"17 and s 93 in speaking of 'provin-
cial government' appears to do the same in respect of the provinces.
However, for the most part it seems that the term is generally
confined to the executive branch of 'government' and, in many
instances,118 it replaces the former terms 'the Crown' and 'Gov-
ernor-General-in-Council'. 1 9 It may be that, in ordinary usage, we
still tend to make a subconscious distinction between the policy-
making functions of 'government'-to which we attach the label
'government', and the law-implementing functions-to which we
attach the term 'executive',120 the former being subject to the
control of Parliament, and the latter to the control of the courts.12
In many respects 'the government' (that is, executive government)
is much more interesting than 'the State', because here we are
dealing with the tangible machinery of 'the State'; and, perhaps
because of this, the law has been much more consistent. Neverthe-
less, its meaning is still very uncertain. Here I shall examine: (1) the
extent to which 'the Government' is treated by the law as a single,
legal persona; (2) how far 'the Government' extends; and (3) the
112 In ss 16, 19, 23, 61, 108(2) and 116. "3 Act 57 of 1973.
14 Constitution Act s 19. "' Idem s 116(2).
16 Idem s 23. Numerous other statutes use 'the Government' as an official designation. For
a few examples, see the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951 s 4(1)(c); the State Liability Act 20 of
1957; the Post Office Act 44 of 1958; the Promotion of Black Self-government Act 46 of 1959
s 3; and the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 1963 s 22.
11 Section 23 reads: 'Save as is otherwise provided in section twenty-seven [which states that
the seat of the legislature shall be in Cape Town], Pretoria shall be the seat of Government of
the Republic.' At lower levels, the term 'government' is applied to all functions (for example,
s 93: 'provincial government'; the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951 s 3(1): 'tribal or com-
munity government').
"I But cfthe Constitution Act s 3(b) and (c).
119 Cf South African Associated Newspapers Ltd v Estate Pelser 1975 (4) SA 797 (A) at 805F-G.
11 Cf 215 above, and Vile 231: 'The "executive" must act according to the law, the
"government" must exercise leadership in the development of policy.'
1' Cf Vile ibid.
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extent to which 'the Government' is, in our law, identified with
'the State'.
(1) The Government as a single, legal persona
Until 1934 the 'Executive Government' of the Union was for-
mally vested in 'the King', and was administered 'by His Majesty in
person or by a Governor-General as his representative'.'- Thus it
was appropriate to equate the 'Executive Government' with the
'Crown', and therefore important to have a 'Crown Liabilities
Act'. 2 3 In 1934, giving effect to a convention which had already
developed, the Status of the Union Act'24 repealed the provisions of
s 8 of the South Africa Act, and provided that the 'Executive
Government' in relation to domestic affairs was vested in the King
acting on the advice of his Union Ministers.'" As a result, 'the
Crown' came to mean either the 'King-in-Council' or the 'Gov-
ernor-General-in-Council'., n 6 Thus 'Crown', 'Government', 'Gov-
ernor-General-in-Council' etc were used as interchangeable terms.
Furthermore, it was natural to treat 'the Government', being 'the
Crown' in South Africa, as if it were a corporate entity: 2 7
'The Governor-General-in-Council (whom I shall call the Crown and who is
also sometimes referred to as the Government of the Union) is regarded in law as
a legal persona, with a perennial existence, and as such, a legal persona distinct
from the individual human beings or group of persons who from time to time
hold office as Governor-General and as members of the Executive Council, just
as the King or the Crown in England is regarded as a corporation sole with a
perpetual existence, and, as such, distinct from His Majesty the King.'
Recognition of 'the Government' as a legal persona was possible
and made sense because it was personified by known individuals
and institutions who physically carried out the executive functions
of government for the Union. But this recognition attributed no
metaphysical 'personality' to 'the Government': in fact the court in
the Spoorbond case was anxious to prevent such deductions. Chief
Justice Watermeyer emphasized that the Crown was 'only a legal
conception and takes no part in the management of the
Railways','12 and that any new consequences resulting from the fact
that the Crown was recognized as a legal persona would constitute
an extension of existing law, not a deduction from a priori concepts.' 29
Schreiner JA, concurring, insisted that the fact that it was 'con-
venient for certain purposes to treat the Crown as a corporation or
artificial person' did not warrant the further conclusion that it
should automatically be treated in the same way as other artificial
'z South Africa Act 1909 s 8. 12 Act 1 of 1910. 24 Act 69 of 1934 s 11(1).
l5 Idem s 4.
12 See, for example, Swarts v Minister of Justice 1941 AD 181 at 186-7; Die Spoorbond v South
African Railways 1946 AD 999 at 1005. Cf R vJones 1962 (3) SA 1 (FC) at 16.
"z Die Spoorbond (above) at 1005 (per Watermeyer CJ). 121 Idem at 1009.
12 Idem at 1008.
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persons-something which would otherwise have followed if there
was anything inherent in the concept of corporate personality.130
In one respect, however, it might be said that metaphysics
entered judicial treatment of 'the Government'. Some cases have
held or suggested that 'the Crown' ('the Government') cannot sue
'itself'. For instance, when the Natal Provincial Administration
attempted to sue the South African Railways, the former's claim
was dismissed on exception on the basis that, as the province was a
department of the Crown, it could not sue another department (viz
the Railways), since this would involve the Crown's suing itself. 31
But to talk of 'the Crown' suing 'itself' is to assume the dogma of
indivisibility of 'the Crown', which is itself linked to the dogma of
indivisible sovereignty-all reminiscent of the judicial atempts to
grapple with these notions in federal countries. 132 While such a view
of 'the Crown' is probably correct in law, given the English
approach, there is nothing inherently or logically necessary about this
approach. 33 In fact it has only led to a lot of unnecessary trouble in
the case of maxims such as 'the Crown can do no wrong'. The
Natal Provincial Administration case was probably really decided on
the policy issues which militate against claims between departments
of the Crown being adjudicated in the courts.'3 In any event, that
such conceptual symmetry cannot be maintained in practice is
demonstrated by the case of South African Railways v Kemp, 35
where a man who had been sued by the South African Railways
had attempted to raise by way of a counterclaim a dispute that he
had with the Department of Defence. In that case the Transvaal
Court refused to treat 'the Government' as one and the same person
for the purposes of counterclaims. Although the court accepted that
the Railways was, since Union, no longer itself a body corporate,
and that it was certainly a part of the 'Government',' 3 6 the court
110 See SchreinerJA at 1011-12 (partially quoted in note 90 above).
13' Natal Provincial Administration v South African Railways and Harbours 1936 NPD 643. Cf
South African Railways v Registrar of Deeds (Natal) (1919) 40 NLR 66 at 67.
132 See, for example, the discussions in R v Jones 1962 (1) SA 503 (SR), 1962 (3) SA 1 (FC).
133 See Marshall 33.
134 The fact that the 'same money' was involved (Provincial Revenue Fund money, which
came largely from the Consolidated Revenue Fund) seemed to make the dispute between
the two departments incongruous (see the Natal Provincial Administration case (note 131
above) at 654-62, 664). Indeed, the court accepted that for other purposes the Provincial
Administration could be treated as distinct and capable of having a claim against 'the King in
His government of the Union' (at 651; and cf Union Government v Transvaal Provincial
Administration 1918 TPD 169). The Limitation of Legal Proceedings (Provincial and Local
Authorities) Act 94 of 1970, which limits the time within which actions may be instituted
against provincial administrations, appears to provide for the possibility of litigation between
provincial administrations and the State by providing, in s 6, that 'This Act shall bind the
State'.
135 1916 TPD 174.
136 That the South African Railways and Harbours (now the South African Transport
Services) was undoubtedly a part of 'the Crown' and that it could represent 'the Government
of the Union' for certain purposes was confirmed in Winter v South African Railways and
Harbours 1929 AD 100. The position is now regulated by s 3(1) of the South African Transport
Services Act 65 of 1981 (quoted 223 above). But a dichotomy between 'the State' and the
South African Transport Services is still evident: see, for example, ss 3(2), 9(2) and 9(4).
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refused to regard it as the same 'person' for the purposes of
counterclaims. Stress was laid on the fact that it had its own
Railway Fund 13 and that it was treated separately by statute 3 8
Although the decision would not please conceptualists much, it was
in fact the only sensible conclusion to which the court could come.
To pretend that because the Railways was as much a part of 'the
Government' as the Department of Defence (and thus liable finan-
cially and managerially to meet the latter's obligations and account
for its acts) would be to stretch the myth of corporate personality
with regard to 'the Government' to the realm of sheer nonsense.
To conclude, then, it seems that, like 'the State', 'the Govern-
ment' is a legal entity for some purposes 139 but, particularly in the
case of financial matters, not others. t4° The actions of departments
and officers very different from one another are attributed to 'the
Government' without there being any necessary system to the
conglomeration of rules that operate. Nor, it is suggested, could a
realistic system be imposed given the wide diversity of activities
upon which 'the Government' embarks.
(2) How far does 'the Government' extend?
'The Government' describes not only the executive functionaries
of central government. It would be misleading to suggest that all the
'departments of State', for whom members of the Executive Coun-
cil ('the Government') are responsible, constitute 'the Government':
first, because they are not all called 'departments', 4t and secondly,
because 'the Government' extends to the provincial governments,
as is clear from numerous cases in which this has been
emphasized. 142
137 1916 TPD 174 at 177 (De Villiers JP). 3' Idem at 179 (Mason J).
'39 There is no question that 'the Government' has locus standi to sue and that it does sue
under this title: see, for example, Marais v Government of the Union of South Africa 1911 TPD
127; Ex parte the Government 1914 TPD 596; Government of the Republic of South Africa v
Motsuenyane 1963 (2) SA 484 (T); The Government v Regna-Adwel Business Machines Africa (Pty)
Ltd 1970 (2) SA 428 (T); Government of the Republic of South Africa v Ngubane 1972 (2) SA 601
(A); The Government v Thorne and another NNO 1974 (2) SA 1 (A); and Government of the
Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A).
40 The South African Transport Services (old Railways and Harbours Administration) and
Post Office have their own Revenue Funds, distinct from the 'State Revenue Fund' (the
Railways and Harbours Finances and Accounts Act 48 of 1977 s 2; and the Post Office Act 44
of 1958 s 12D). The South African Transport Services can purchase, expropriate and own
property in its own name (the South African Transport Services Act 65 of 1981 s 9(1); the
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 s 4). And, of course, numerous other legal differences relating to
these and many other 'organs' of 'the Government' could be listed. To attempt to construct
around them a theory of corporate personality of 'the Government', let alone 'the State',
would prove a hopeless (and worthless) task.
141 See the diverse list of titles in the First Schedule to the Public Service Act 54 of 1957.
142 See Ex parte Van der Merwe: In re Havenga's Election 1916 OPD 26; South African Railways
v Registrar of Deeds (Natal) (1919) 40 NLR 66; Natal Provincial Administration v South African
Railways and Harbours 1936 NPD 643; Pretoria City Council v Lombard NO 1949 (1) SA 166 (T)
at 176; S v Tromp 1966 (1) SA 646 (N) at 654; Van der Linde v Calitz 1967 (2) SA 239 (A) at
260-1; and Theron v Hylton-Smith 1978 (2) SA 294 (N) at 296. Note also that the provincial
administrations are treated as part of the 'public service' by the Public Service Act 54 of 1957.
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Perhaps one could say that when statutes confer powers on 'the
Government', this refers to the State President acting on the advice
of the Executive Council, 143 or 'the Cabinet'. And, when Par-
liament deems it fit to confer powers and duties on a specifically
named department or other body, if it is either one of the 'depart-
ments' of the 'public service' (including the provincial administra-
tions) or the South African Transport Services or Post Office, one
is concerned with 'the Government' in a loose sense. If it ever
became legally important to determine whether 'the Government'
also includes any of the plethora of extra-departmental statutory
bodies, this would have to be resolved by the construction of the
statute concerned.'*4 Nothing could be deduced from the concept of
'the Government' itself.
(3) Does 'the Government' = 'the State'?
Conceptualists have argued that 'the State' has become the all-
embracing corporate entity in South Africa and that it acts through
its 'organs', some of which might be parts of the old 'Crown' or
'Government'. 4 5 In other words, 'the Crown' or 'the Government'
and various other institutions have been absorbed by the concept of
'the State' and no longer have any independent life of their own.
The influence of these views is undoubtedly apparent in the word-
ing of various pieces of legislation. It was the motivation for
changing the name of the 'Crown' Liability Act to the 'State'
Liability Act'46 and for equating 'the Crown', not with 'the Gov-
ernment', but with 'the Republic or the State President' in the
Constitution Act; and it acounts for the interesting difference of
wording in the long titles of the Indemnity Acts of 1961 and
1977. 17
Nevertheless, despite the criticism of these authors, the courts
have not experienced difficulty in maintaining, on the one hand,
that 'the Government' is a legal persona and, on the other, that 'the
Government' is 'the State' for certain purposes. And it seems to me,
with respect, that they have approached the issue in a sensible way.
The approach adopted was formulated by Vieyra J in Die Regering
van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika v SANTAM Versekeringsmaat-
skappy Bpk,14 8 in which exception had been taken to a claim
143 Constitution Act s 16(1) and (2).
I" Various criteria would have to be canvassed, such as the source of finance for the
activities concerned, who is ultimately responsible for them, etc. (Cf the approach of the court
in In re Havenga's Election 1916 OPD 26, especially at 36f1).
s See the authors cited in note 87 above.
'~ See VerLoren van Themaat op cit note 87 above.
"7 The long titles of Acts 61 of 1961 and 13 of 1977 read, respectively: 'Act to indemnify the
Government, its officers and all other persons acting under its or their authority . .. ' and 'Act
to indemnify the State, members of the Executive Council of the- Republic, persons in the
service of the State and persons acting under their authority . . .'. Cf also their respective ss
1(1).
1964 (1) SA 546 (W).
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launched in the name of 'die Regering' on the ground that 'die
Regering', as opposed to 'the State' or 'the Republic of South
Africa', did not have locus standi. It was argued by the excipients
that, while 'the Government' might have existed as a legal persona
and as 'the Crown' until 1957, once the 'State' Liability Act
replaced the 'Crown' Liability Act 'the Government' lost its locus
standi, because a newly-formed 'State' had absorbed it, and it was,
henceforth, no more than an 'organ' of 'the State'. This argument
was rejected; the court pointed out that the change in wording was
to give effect to South Africa's 'nationhood' and 'sovereign'
independence, removing the connotations of subservience which
had attached to the use of the term 'Crown' in South Africa. 4 9 The
suggestion that one should draw analogies between companies and
their boards, on the one hand, and 'the State' and its 'Government',
on the other, was thought to be 'incorrect', even though this might
give rise to an apparent anomaly. In terms which appropriately
express the way in which we ascribe acts to 'the State', Vieyra J
said:15 0
'... the State has many facets, executive, legislative and judicial, and accord-
ingly where rights and duties arise similar to those of the ordinary juristic
person, natural or otherwise, it is expedient that the Government, ie the
executive power, should be considered as the embodiment of the State's position
in such regard.'
Shortly afterwards Caney J, in S v Tromp, used terms which
express a similar approach:"'
'It is clear that the State has many Departments or, as they have frequently
been styled, manifestations. Thus it has been held that the South African Railways
and Harbours is a Department of the State ... as is a Provincial Administration.
Terms such as 'organ' or 'agent' are used to express metaphorically
the fact that we ascribe certain acts to 'the State', even though no
such thing exists in a physical sense. It is only failure to appreciate
this that leads to the temptation to reason by analogy and to reject
the notion of a 'corporation within a corporation'. If one were to
take the view that 'the Government' cannot, if it represents 'the
State', be a corporation itself, then one must also argue that the
provincial administrations, the State Tender Board etc, all of which
represent 'the State', do not have 'corporate' features such as locus
standi in judicio themselves, and this is, of course, absurd.
The fact that we ascribe acts of certain officials or organs to 'the
State' explains why for some purposes those officials or organs are
'the State'. 5 2 This does not mean that nothing else can be 'the State'
149 Idem at 549. 1s Idem at 548.
15 1966 (1) SA 646 (N) at 654 (my emphasis).
15' Cf S v De Bruin 1975 (3) SA 56 (T), where the court, dealing with precedents on the
question of whether statutes bind the State, remarked: 'Met "the Crown" word in die verband
eenvoudig bedoel-"'die Staat"' (at 58F); and cf the court's equation of the 'servants' of the State
with 'the State' at 62-6. In South African Associated Newspapers Ltd v Estate Pelser 1975 (4) SA
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on another occasion and in different circumstances. It also explains
why sometimes, when we are forced to find a 'Crown-substitute'
for the purposes of the crime of treason etc, we have to resort to
that 'manifestation' of 'the State' which has features closest to those
of a natural person: that is, 'the Government'. This the courts were
obliged to do in R v Leibbrandt153 and R v Neumann 54 despite the
fact that in Leibbrandt Watermeyer CJ had earlier furnished a
metaphysical conception of 'the State'.155
(iii) 'National'
It is not uncommon for the legislature to refer to the statutory
bodies or institutions which it creates as 'national'. Thus in the
Constitution Act we have a 'National' Flag and 'National'
Anthem, 156 there are bodies such as the 'National' Transport Com-
mission, 157 and we have 'national' monuments.158
While the term 'national' has a great deal of significance in the
realm of public international law, especially when used in distinc-
tion to 'citizenship', 5 9 it seems that it has relatively little legal
significance in municipal law. The use of the term in South Africa,
except in relation to matters of citizenship, seems to be for three
purposes. First, it is used to express the central, nation-wide feature
or jurisdiction of the body concerned. Thus the National Transport
Commission, the National Health Policy Council'60 and the
National Air Pollution Advisory Committee,1 61 to mention a few
examples, are concerned with the whole of the Republic and conse-
quently operate from the central level of government. Perhaps they
could just as easily be called the 'South African Transport Commis-
sion' etc, like the 'South African Medical Research Council', 162 but
the 'State Transport Commission' would not have expressed quite
the same meaning.
797 (A) the Appellate Division accepted that 'the Government in its executive branch is a body
sui generis' and that, in 'its executive functions, the Government (and thus the Executive
Council) represents the State, and is wholly identified with it' (at 806E, my emphasis). Rose
Innes treats 'the Government' and 'the State' as the same thing (L A Rose InnesJudicial Review
of Administrative Tribunals in South Africa (1963) 228).
"1 1944 AD 253 at 281: 'For the purposes of the law of treason the Government is wholly
identified with the State . . .' (per Watermeyer CJ, quoting with approval the judgment of
Schreiner J in the Special Court below).
1- 1949 (3) SA 1238 (Special Criminal Court, Transvaal) at 1259-61. Cf SANTAM (note
148 above) at 548; Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke NO 1968 (2) SA 284 (RAD) at 366-7; and
Estate Pelser (note 152 above) at 806.
"' 1944 AD 253 at 279: 'The State against which the hostile intent must exist is, of course,
the people of the Union of South Africa organized as a State, of which the King, under the
South Africa Act, is the head.'
's Sections 4 and 6 respectively. ' Transport (Co-ordination) Act 44 of 1948 s 3.
's' National Monuments Act 28 of 1969.
Is9 See, for example, John Dugard 'South Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise
in Denationalization' (1980) 10 Denver J of International Law and- Policy 11 at 21-2 (and the
works there cited).
"0 Health Act 63 of 1977 s 10.
161 Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965 s 2.
" South African Medical Research Council Act 16 of 1969.
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Secondly, the term is used to indicate more clearly than would
the term 'State', that the thing in question is 'for the people' or 'the
nation'. It would be here that national monuments fit in.
National flags and anthems seem to straddle the second usage and
a third, which is where the term is used to demarcate one 'nation'
from another. This last use of the term not only begins to shade
into international law by definition, but it has become highly
ambiguous since the rise of the 'nation State'. Thus one can confuse
two criteria for determining what is meant by 'nation'. On the one
hand, if one is talking about 'nationals of a State' then the indepen-
dence of the State is all important.1 63 But if one is referring to
nations within a State-the favourite South African game-then one
may be referring to groups which 'form separate National units on
the basis of language and culture';164 and only in this way can one
make legal sense of the ultimate political absurdity of a National
States Constitution Act,16 which refers to 'States' within a 'State'.
(iv) 'Administration'
'Administration' is one of the most notoriously ambiguous terms
in public law. It has not only acquired new connotations during its
historical evolution,- 6 but it is a term that carries a multitude of
meanings in contemporary usage, and it is used in both public and
private affairs. As a term of art it would not really matter how it
was used but for the fact that the most generally accepted 'defini-
tion' of administrative law is Jennings's laconic tautology:
'Administrative law is the law relating to the Administration. ' 167
Thus what the 'administration' is is a question vital to the definition
of administrative law. 16'
The first difficulty comes with the way in which the term is used
in the realm of public affairs. It is sometimes used, with a capital
'A', to refer to a specific Cabinet (that is, Executive Council), as
distinct from its wider use, with a small 'a', to describe the whole
'public administration'. 69 But, as we have just seen, Jennings uses a
capital 'A' for the wider use of the term. Moreover, attempts merely
to equate the term simply with 'the Government' are frustrated by
the fact that there is no clarity about the precise extent of the use of
'the Government' which does not seem to cover a number of
1 Because the term here is concerned with the legal connection between the individual and
the State (see Dugard op cit note 159 above at 22).16 From the preamble to the Promotion of Black Self-goverment Act 46 of 1959.
165 Act 21 of 1971; and see the National States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970.
'" See 215 above; and especially Dunsire ch 1.
16' W Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution 5 ed (1959) 217. He does, however, qualify
this by adding: 'It determines the organization, powers and duties of the administrative
authorities.'
16' No attempt will be made to furnish a definition of 'administrative law' here.
'69 Dunsire 4. Cf the globular description by Rose Innes Judicial Review of Administrative
Tribunals 228.
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'administering' bodies, such as local authorities, that we would
usually class under the 'public administration' and that are subject
to the principles of administrative law.
It will not help to use the term 'administration' to distinguish it,
functionally, from 'the Government' (even if by 'Government' we
mean only the State President-in-Executive-Council), on the basis
that the latter determines policy and the former simply carries it
out. Not only does this presuppose a clear distinction between
policy and administration,'7- it also leads one into a complicated
distinction between the Cabinet and its ministers.
The resort of some writers has been to adopt a negative, institu-
tionalt7' description, counting as the 'administration' all those
organs of State apart from those that are 'legislative' or 'judicial'. 172
The difficulty with this is that the label of the institution depends
largely upon its function, and it is not possible to make really
satisfactory distinctions between the three functions of government,
either in practice or in logic. 173 This means that we beg the very
question we are asking and, since all organs of government perform
all three functions, we are driven to saying that 'the administration'
consists of all the organs of 'the State' apart from those almost
solely concerned with legislating (that is, Parliament, the provincial
councils and the homeland legislative assemblies) or adjudicating
(the Supreme Court and (?) magistrates' courts, but not 'adminis-
trative' courts). 174
Finally, it is not always easy to distinguish between 'public' and
private' administration. The fact that an institution wields statu-
tory powers is not necessarily a guide, 17 nor is the fact that a body
must or should act in the 'public interest' or provide 'public'
services, since a number of obviously private charitable and other
organizations would fall into this category. 7 6 Public finance may be
a guide, but would we regard bakeries as part of the 'public
administration' because their bread is government-subsidized?'7
While the question is of importance where administrative law
differs from other law either in substance or according to the courts
i7 See, for instance, L G Baxter 'Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy and Corporatism' in L J
Boulle and L G Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and Political Options (1981) 75 at
106; Supplement (1981) 24ff.
'I Cf Vile 285.
172 For example, Henning op cit note 77 above at 90; D'Oliviera op cit note 77 above at
29-30. Cf Wiechers Die Sistematiek van die Administratiefreg op cit note 65 above at 87-8.
'73 Cf Marshall ch V and especially 114ff.
'"4 Further difficulties arise for those who adopt the 'authority/power' approach to adminis-
trative law, in terms of which only those organs that wield superior power over the individual
are in a true 'adminstrative-law relationship' (see, for instance, Wiechers Administratiefreg ch 3
and especially 68-71).
I's For example, is the Estate Agents' Board (Act 112 of 1976 s 2) part of the 'public
administration'?
176 Cf Wiechers Administratiefreg 68.
'" See further, for instance, Marshall Constitutional Theory 22ff; Dunsire ch 10; and Peter
Cane 'Standing, Legality and the Limits of Public Law' 1981 Public Law 322 at 324-5.
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which must apply it, for the most part it matters little what we call
the 'public administration' in countries such as South Africa, where
'administrative law' is a part of the general body of law and largely
administered in the ordinary courts (except where statutes provide
otherwise, in which case one refers to the statute). And so, for the
time being at least, we can continue to get away with rhetoric and
equivocation when using the term 'the administration'.
CONCLUSION
As is evident, I am one of those who repudiates the personifica-
tion of 'the State" 8 as being no more than metaphysical and
unnecessary mumbo-jumbo for lawyers. While theories of person-
ality may have a respectable part to play in political philosophy,
any attempt to deduce law from them can, in my view, only cause
one to lull oneself into a false sense of security and paper over the
cracks of reality. Far better is to understand how terms such as 'the
State' have developed, how they are used, and the process by which
we ascribe legal consequences to certain activities, persons and
institutions-legal consequences that do not derive from any in-
herent or natural characteristics of these activities, persons or insti-
tutions, but that derive from the law as stipulated by the cases and
common law. This is particularly true, it is submitted, in the field
of public law, where constitutionalism 179 dictates a strict approach
to the interpretation of the powers of public bodies.
There is, besides, much advantage to be gained from maintaining
a rich diversity of terminology.180 Acceptance of this diversity
removes the self-consciousness that otherwise leads to complicated
and unnecessary repetition in the statutes which concern themselves
with the machinery, possessions and functions of our 'State'.'
L G BAXTER*
THREE WORDS FROM THE LEGISLATORS ...
'In the United States, Roscoe Pound's (1870-1964) writings have shown that
law comprehends, independently of legal norms, a whole series of legal
concepts and methods. One has a very incomplete grasp of what the law is if
consideration is only given to its concrete rules at any given time. [Footnote:]
For this reason one can see only a quip in the often cited words of Kirsch-
mann: "Drei berichtigende Worte des Gesetzgebers und ganze Bibliotheken
werden zur Makulatur" (Three words from the legislators, and entire libraries
can go to the pulpmill)': Ren6 David and John E C Brierly Major Legal Systems
in the World Today (1968) 10-11.
"7s Cf Rose Innes Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals 228n2.
1"9 One common value to which most lawyers would probably still subscribe.
18' Cf Marshall 24-5.
18' As in the case of the way in which 'the Republic' has been used in the Constitution Act
(see 224f above).
* BCom LLB (Natal) LLB Diploma in Legal Studies (Cantab), Attorney, Senior Lecturer in
Law, School of Law Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal.
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